Successful By Our Standards

U.S. Deterrence in the Middle East

U.S. F-35A Lightning II assigned to the 4th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, Al Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates, Sept. 10. (Staff Sgt. Chris Drzazgowski/Air Force)

Defense hawks today see a war in Gaza, strikes on Israel from Hezbollah and Iran itself, sustained Houthi threats to shipping in the Red Sea, and the lack of forward movement on any negotiated ceasefire deal. They are—in turn—right to wonder if the beacon of security in the region that the U.S. calls “deterrence” hasn't spectacularly failed.

If the primary objective of U.S. policy in the region is to protect our allies and secure our interests, then why is Israel still mired in war? Why is shipping still stalled in the Red Sea? And why is Iran flirting with missile salvos, like it did in April? 

By all these measures, they would be right—U.S. deterrent postures (and by this, I am referring to a delicate network of diplomacy, military, and the Abraham Accords) in the region have failed to prevent Israel from being targeted by missiles, or the Houthis from disrupting shipping. 

But, crucially, the quixotic suggestion that deterrence equals the prevention of harm is not the Biden Administration’s objective for deterrence, which instead aims for one thing: to prevent escalation into a regional war. Like it or not, think it sufficient or not, this goal has been met by U.S. force structures in the region. 

This isn’t a pious defense of Biden’s defense strategy. It is simply worth taking published deterrence policy at its word instead of claiming that deterrence has failed by one’s own measure. And as far as the Biden Administration is concerned, the complete absence of activity in the region is not the status quo in the first place (Iran has been poking allies for decades) and is not a credible measurement of deterrence success.

As of now, no actor in the Middle East has violated an American security guarantee—that is because, in the Middle East, we have none. We are not obliged by treaty to defend Israel or any other Gulf State in the Middle East. Instead, security in the region on U.S. terms is guaranteed not by law, but by a combination of political signaling (willingness) and dormant military force (capability) which makes up deterrence (Iran understands that the U.S. is willing and capable of inflicting certain punishments for certain unsavory behavior). 

Deterrence holds as long as adversaries believe that, sine qua non, the cost of war outweighs the benefits – unlike Putin did in Ukraine, or Japan in Pearl Harbor. If the adversary decides to engage in war, it usually means that either that actor is in such a terrible position already that war is pretty much the only option, regardless of the effects (Japan, 1941) or that the actor genuinely believes its capabilities commensurate or better than their opponent, and success a real option (Russia, 2022).

So then, why is U.S. deterrence mysteriously holding back a deluge of regional war? Iran sure seems willing to sacrifice the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah for the sake of regional hegemony. It also seems to be signaling a military ascendancy with recent news of its transfer of hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia.

Current drama aside, Iran neither thinks its capabilities are better than the U.S. or Israel's, nor that regional war will bring about its goals. And that was true even before last month when the Pentagon majorly boosted our defense posture in the Middle East.

There are now two aircraft carriers operating in the Gulf of Oman and Gulf of Aden, the USS Theodore and the USS Abraham Lincoln. We've also sent USS Georgia, a missile-guided submarine, within striking distance of Iran. We've also stationed two missile destroyers, the USS Cole and USS Laboon, in the Red Sea. 

Adversaries understand a plausible scenario, should an all-out war ensue, would include U.S. and Israeli strikers targeting Hezbollah’s infrastructure and Iranian critical military, oil, and nuclear infrastructure. On the defensive side, several stealth fighters and interceptors would be tasked with intercepting UAVs and ballistic missiles, as well as assisting Israel in doing the same.

The result? A damaged Israel, a U.S. dragged back into kinetic fighting in the region—in exchange for the obliteration of Hezbollah and the flattening of Iranian critical nuclear and civilian infrastructure. Not to mention the live excoriation of Iran’s Axis of Resistance by Western media, which until now has trended warmly towards the aims of the coalition while the war in Gaza drags on.

This is why the arguments that deficits in the U.S. military-industrial base have led to a failure of deterrence don't hold up against Iran and its proxies, and why those arguments conflate the failure of deterrence writ large, with one-off attacks in a region at war.

It is a more credible argument for China, with its rapidly expanding naval presence in the Pacific, wherein they may be willing to annex Taiwan based on military capability alone; Iran doesn't have close to the military capability needed to pose a real threat to the U.S. If Iran engaged in war, it would be making the same calculus that Hamas did: short-term punishing gains for ideological purposes is worth the cost of most of its civilian population and possibly territory.

And worth remembering is that thinking is exactly why Iran has proxies in the first place: to employ its ideology while minimizing risk.

So, as far as we know, the benefits of calling America’s bluff and launching a multi-proxy offensive on Israel and U.S. bases in the region are not concrete enough and not sufficient to outweigh the cost that the U.S. posture in the region promises to inflict.

And yes, Iran's domestic politics are unstable, and its economy is in disarray—but it does not fix either of these issues by martyring itself in front of a bolstered U.S. position right now. Even if Khamenei wanted to push a "rally around the flag" effect to save public opinion, domestic instability is likely too high for even war to bring cohesion. 

Meanwhile, Hezbollah and Israel exchanged heavy missile salvos last month following the Israeli killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr. The assassination of a senior member of its organization, and for Iran, the assassination of the leader of its proxy force in its capital on the day of the inauguration of Iran's new president, Pezeshkian, was profoundly humiliating for Iran, prompting fears of massive escalation. Iran could have conveniently used the killing of Haniyeh in Tehran as justification for retaliation against Israel—indeed, Ayatollah Khamenei vowed immediately following the event that "Iran considered its duty to take revenge" for Haniyeh's death. 

And to be clear, Hezbollah has the military power to blanket Israel with missiles and strike strategic and civilian targets (unlike Hamas)—it just has not chosen to do so, likely making the same calculation that Iran has done.

Still, after Israel sent a salvo of pre-emptive strikes on August 25th and countered Hezbollah's response, both Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah closed the parentheses, saying that this preliminary response was satisfactory, for now, and Israel and Hezbollah have returned to low-level fighting on their border. 

Subsequently, Iran didn’t take revenge as promised—it is likely counting Hezbollah's retaliation as its own. Iran could also be feeling reined in after they attacked Israel in April, and sent over 300 missiles towards Israel, nearly all of which were deflected by a U.S.-led coalition including Israel, Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. 

Strategically, too, Iran is fiercely protective of its burgeoning nuclear facilities. Israel has shown itself capable, with U.S. assistance and munitions, of striking Iranian nuclear industries, if it wanted. This is why, recently, Iran has opted for a less for less strategy—in exchange for less IAEA oversight and less U.S. pressure for capitulation to a nuclear disarmament scheme similar to the JCPOA, Iran might go slower on enrichment, might go slower on weaponization. It is not in a position to threaten its progress on this.

All told, the costs for Iran to "take advantage of Israel's distraction in Gaza" as some warn, and push a broader war, are far, far outsized to any possible gains. 

There is one circumstance in the Middle East where U.S. deterrence has failed, though, and I am not the first to say so. The U.S. objective to deter Houthi aggression in the Red Sea, and ensure "freedom of navigation for all countries and bolstering regional security and prosperity" as stated, has not succeeded.

The Houthis have been striking ships in the Red Sea for over a year, both in solidarity with Hamas after October 7th and in pursuit of derailing the Israel-Saudi defense deal. Operation Prosperity Guardian and its corollary Operation Poseidon Archer did not achieve this stated goal. Though we still have two missile destroyers in the Red Sea, no real forward motion has been achieved. Houthi forces disregarded the ultimatum issued in January of this year, and to this day are still striking shipping, and cargos continue to re-route their shipping around the Cape.

Luckily, the Houthis don't have the capability to spread widescale war in the Middle East, though they do pose a serious threat to freedom of navigation in and around the Red Sea for commercial tankers.

All told, signs point to a continued slow burn for Iran toward its ideological and tactical objectives, (this includes shipping missiles to Russia). However, given a new more moderate president and an aging Ayatollah, Iran has been fairly dormant given the circumstances ongoing in its backyard. For deterrence in the Middle East to fail, adversaries (most importantly, Iran and Hezbollah) would need to decide, radically, that they had a chance at success against the U.S. and Israel.

Of course, we are headed towards a possibly destabilizing election in the U.S., while Netanyahu’s administration is not long for this world.

This won’t have an immediate bearing on Iran’s calculations; the Israel-U.S. relationship is massively institutionalized. No matter who is in office, aid will continue to flow to Israel via a memorandum of understanding from the U.S. to provide it with $3.8 billion per year through 2028, and negotiations will be conducted at the level of defense secretaries and officials, if needed.

One bonus consideration. Harris’ replacement of Biden at the top of the ticket. Does this mean that deterrence goals have shifted? If you have been following Harris’ foreign policy playbook, then you know that, as of now, she is mirroring Biden’s goals and will aim for continuity with his objectives. The deterrent goals should remain the same.

As it stands today, the motivations of adversaries are not such that they appear poised to dismantle the U.S. deterrent posture. As we have seen, those who are more willing to break from Iran’s cautious posture—the Houthis, and Hamas—are not capable of triggering participation from Iran and Hezbollah. There is rarely an opportunity to close the breach between U.S. and Iranian objectives, but they do share this one goal: escalation is in nobody’s interest.