The Strategy of Myopia

Colby’s Vision of American Policy

Elbridge Colby—as much as this pains me to say—is probably the single qualified and experienced political appointee currently at the Pentagon.

He knows how to effectively navigate DoD bureaucracy and push forward his policies with very little pushback.

He also happens to be one of the most zero-sum thinkers in DC.

The beginning and end of every policy for Colby is that every action ought to maximize our posture as it relates to China.

I agree that Taiwan matters. I agree that the first island chain matters. I agree that having sufficient munitions and platforms to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan matters.

I just also believe supporting Ukraine and maintaining stability in the Middle East can be done—and also matter.

Colby does not.

Colby tends to not offer any real justifications for why he thinks we cannot do this outside of vague gestures at limitations on production capacity and resource investment.

He tends to simply assert as a truism that munitions such as 155mm artillery rounds—a munition that we have greatly expanded our productive capacity for—cannot be sent to Ukraine for readiness reasons.

Never mind the obvious objection of just how relevant any of these munitions would be for a fight over Taiwan would even be.

Colby is also callous to the fact that cutting off the supply of key munitions to Ukraine will kill members of the Ukrainian military.

There will be Ukrainian soldiers who do not return to their families because of fire missions that cannot be prosecuted.

Colby has a better point when it comes to PAC-3 interceptors that the United States still has limited production capacity for. These interceptors are as critical to any Taiwan contingency as they are key to keeping the residents of Kyiv safe from Russian cruise missiles.

The problem with Colby’s analysis—however—is that we’re not resolving this issue by withholding interceptors from Ukraine.

The couple dozen interceptors being saved here are hardly going to make a difference in fending off the PLARF. This is a problem of needing the will to push through the costly and time intensive project of greatly expanding our PAC-3 production.

There’s no reason to believe that a handful of PAC-3s being handed over in the interim while we did that problem is going to break INDOPACOM.

It’s even less believable of an argument concerning limited resources in the context of CENTCOM recently being able to summon half of the United States military at a moments notice when they asked for it.

It’s also worth mentioning how this only further undermines America’s position vis-à-vis Europe. We’ve already been on tenuous ground thanks to our tariffs on the EU and the deeply unserious diplomatic overtures to Russia.

Pulling our support to Ukraine in a completely uncoordinated fashion will only reinforce Europe’s perception that America cannot be counted on to fulfill our commitments.

We will obtain an immaterial short term benefit of more munitions for a war that is yet to be fought in exchange for hastening Europe’s long term pivot away from America.

It is also worth noting that supporting Ukraine comes with the strategic benefit of degrading one of America’s primary adversaries.

In a cold blooded calculus—every 155mm round expended by Ukrainians against the Russian military means any potential future Russian threat would be weaker.

Every failed and costly Russian offensive only sets Moscow further back in their ability to strategically compete with the United States.

In an amoral understanding of international relations—we benefit from doing all of this. You don’t need to see this conflict only through the lens of our values. (Although we ought to see politics through an ethical filter.)

It is also the case that American fickleness regarding our ability to sustain our political will to support Ukraine that inevitably will watched closely by any potential coalition partners in Asia.

When we look exhausted by merely providing military equipment to a third party it raises serious doubts in Tokyo or Canberra about whether they should stick their necks out for us regarding Taiwan.

All of this is immaterial to his single-minded fixation on the orientation of the entire U.S. defense posture to Asia.

However, Colby’s China-focused myopia is also damaging our relationships with the allies in Asia that we rely upon.

His recent demand to Japan that they increase their defense spending to 3.5% of GDP—an outright ridiculous ask for a country with an over 200% debt-to-GDP ratio—caused Japan to postponed a high-level meeting referred to as the “two plus two” talks.

Similarly, Colby has pushed for a review of the AUKUS agreement to see if it aligned with “America First” policies. This despite AUKUS clearly benefiting Washington by increasing the capabilities of Australia to operate in the Pacific. Much like Ukraine—this also apparently blindsided UK and Australian officials.

In a story that was once relayed to me a few years ago—Colby while in Vietnam for a talk—told the Vietnamese in attendance point blank that the United States would not assist Vietnam if China initiated military hostilities with them.

He had also famously argued that the United States should unilaterally strike TSMC in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan to prevent the industry falling into PLA control. He has also advocated for sanctioning Taiwan to coerce Taipei into spending more on defense.

I could list more anecdotes, but I think you get the point that his obsessive vision to focus all American hard power on China has given him the diplomatic tact of a 19th century British colonial administrator.

While it’s doubtful these incidents will blow apart our standing with allies in Asia overnight—he will certainly continue to harm the relationships critical to our ability to deter China the longer he is able to exert significant control over defense policy.

Even more-so if the tariff wars with our friends in Asia continue to incentivize them to hedge their bets against us.

His zero-sum approach means he is simply not capable of putting forward policies that work towards productive outcomes with our partners.

We ought to be using nuanced diplomacy to bring coalitions together to tackle our shared challenges. We should be reassuring our friends when they’re dealing with threats to their security. We could be leveraging our domestic industries and foreign partners to further build the production capacities we need to manage our commitments.

Nothing says we have to abandon half the world for a potential future crisis in another part of the world.

We’re the United States, we can manage multiple problems at once.

Instead, Colby’s poorly considered approach will probably only end up hurting us everywhere.