Clausewitz. War without policy guidance is simple violence. Policy without understanding warfare is folly. Too many politicians have launched wars without understanding how to link policy to guide the violence to achieve political goals. Too many generals have let them get away with it.
There's a problem with this reasoning, partly stemming from very different circumstances among the comparands, partly with lack of foresight.
Zelensky 2024 (according to the post): We are outmatched in almost every facet. Foreign military aid has been on a downward trend for a year. NOT ONE STEP BACK. Because that might create the impression of a hopeless cause in foreign capitals. Even if it contributes to a readily-avoidable disaster that will create the impression of a hopeless cause in foreign capitals. (OK, fine, a few steps back.)
Lincoln 1863: We have massive military resources, but we're running out of time. Someone put them to aggressive and effective use.
So besides the fundamentally opposite strategic profiles of the belligerents, in Lincoln's case military necessity and policy/optics goals are fully aligned. Lincoln wants forward movement that damages the fighting power of the Confederates, and that's exactly what plays well anyway. Zelensky, in this reading, cares for nothing but *delaying* the optics of deterioration even while actually not doing enough to check real deterioration. In other words, the policy course defended in this post is at worst - or observably in the case of Avdiivka - contrary to both military necessity *and* policy/optics goals.
No I mean I think that's totally fair, and that did occur to me while I was writing this that I should point out the important differences (namely the material advantage the Union had, which is more akin to Russia in this example). But I thought I was getting longwinded as it was, and was more focused on getting across the point about the importance of political imperatives to war efforts.
I could go into some detail as to how despite understanding the political constraints and imperatives of the two militaries in the Ukraine War fairly well by 2023, I kept making mistakes of analysis and projection by not sufficiently taking them into account. In the latest case, I didn't realize that aid to Ukraine would be on a steep decline through the second half of 2023, along with Ukraine's internal recruitment/conscription. So I expected Russian baseline aggressiveness would lead them away from what I perceived as militarily optimal - regenerating cautiously with an eye on 2025 - toward a single strategic offensive in 2024. What I failed to appreciate was that developing factors would contribute to a Russian perception that Ukraine was on the ropes *right now*; now they have acted on that perception throughout the fall and winter with multiple strategic offensives starting immediately on the back of the Ukrainian campaign, on top of their traditional strategy of spoiling, diverting, and pressuring everywhere.
That is, Putin probably authorized very heavy acute expenditure of resources because his read on the politics was that Ukraine can break sooner rather than later (and that situation might always be reversed at length?).
I knew Russia technically had the resources for strategic offensives, but my lack of foresight on the level of unfavorability in Western and internal Ukrainian political trends, and how the perception thereof would factor into Russian calculations, led me to assume as late as last October - "maybe Russia was just frontloading the one offensive" - that relative conservatism would reign (on both sides) until 2025.
TLDR: I projected stalemate, but the confluence of Western, Ukrainian, and Russian politics led Russia to act strenuously to avoid stalemate.
Clausewitz. War without policy guidance is simple violence. Policy without understanding warfare is folly. Too many politicians have launched wars without understanding how to link policy to guide the violence to achieve political goals. Too many generals have let them get away with it.
There's a problem with this reasoning, partly stemming from very different circumstances among the comparands, partly with lack of foresight.
Zelensky 2024 (according to the post): We are outmatched in almost every facet. Foreign military aid has been on a downward trend for a year. NOT ONE STEP BACK. Because that might create the impression of a hopeless cause in foreign capitals. Even if it contributes to a readily-avoidable disaster that will create the impression of a hopeless cause in foreign capitals. (OK, fine, a few steps back.)
Lincoln 1863: We have massive military resources, but we're running out of time. Someone put them to aggressive and effective use.
So besides the fundamentally opposite strategic profiles of the belligerents, in Lincoln's case military necessity and policy/optics goals are fully aligned. Lincoln wants forward movement that damages the fighting power of the Confederates, and that's exactly what plays well anyway. Zelensky, in this reading, cares for nothing but *delaying* the optics of deterioration even while actually not doing enough to check real deterioration. In other words, the policy course defended in this post is at worst - or observably in the case of Avdiivka - contrary to both military necessity *and* policy/optics goals.
No I mean I think that's totally fair, and that did occur to me while I was writing this that I should point out the important differences (namely the material advantage the Union had, which is more akin to Russia in this example). But I thought I was getting longwinded as it was, and was more focused on getting across the point about the importance of political imperatives to war efforts.
But I do agree with you on all that.
(.づ◡﹏◡)づ
I could go into some detail as to how despite understanding the political constraints and imperatives of the two militaries in the Ukraine War fairly well by 2023, I kept making mistakes of analysis and projection by not sufficiently taking them into account. In the latest case, I didn't realize that aid to Ukraine would be on a steep decline through the second half of 2023, along with Ukraine's internal recruitment/conscription. So I expected Russian baseline aggressiveness would lead them away from what I perceived as militarily optimal - regenerating cautiously with an eye on 2025 - toward a single strategic offensive in 2024. What I failed to appreciate was that developing factors would contribute to a Russian perception that Ukraine was on the ropes *right now*; now they have acted on that perception throughout the fall and winter with multiple strategic offensives starting immediately on the back of the Ukrainian campaign, on top of their traditional strategy of spoiling, diverting, and pressuring everywhere.
That is, Putin probably authorized very heavy acute expenditure of resources because his read on the politics was that Ukraine can break sooner rather than later (and that situation might always be reversed at length?).
I knew Russia technically had the resources for strategic offensives, but my lack of foresight on the level of unfavorability in Western and internal Ukrainian political trends, and how the perception thereof would factor into Russian calculations, led me to assume as late as last October - "maybe Russia was just frontloading the one offensive" - that relative conservatism would reign (on both sides) until 2025.
TLDR: I projected stalemate, but the confluence of Western, Ukrainian, and Russian politics led Russia to act strenuously to avoid stalemate.